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Abstract
The relationship between population structure and violent conflict is complex and heavily dependent on the 
behavior of other variables like governance, economic prospects, and urbanization. While addressing rapid 
population growth might be a necessary condition for peace, it is by no means sufficient.  Concomitant 
steps must also be taken to foster inclusivity, guarantee broader rights for all, particularly women, rebuild 
social contracts and ensure that all citizens have equal access to economic opportunity.  Measures to control 
family size could reduce dependency and create greater socio-economic opportunities for women and youth, 
By so doing, the “youth bulge” phenomenon could be a boon for rapidly growing developing countries. 
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The vast number of unemployed youth in developing countries are viewed by many as an imminent threat to social welfare and political stability because of their 
tendency to either foment unrest, as was the case during 
the Arab Spring of 2010-2012, or become relatively easily 
influences and recruited by violent extremist groups like 
the so-called Islamic State or Al Shabaab. Many see rapid 
population growth as a key driver,1 because such growth 
generally occurs in countries that are not ruled justly, do not 
guarantee rights for all and where the benefits of economic 
growth are only enjoyed by a very small majority. A tempting 
corollary has been to focus action on reducing the quantum 
of young people these societies, effectively rebalancing the 
population structure in order to match available resources 
with the number of mouths that need to be fed. Potts et al2 
suggest that this could be accomplished by empowering 
women through the provision of family planning services and 
education in their intriguing article “The Pill is Mightier than 
the Sword, which clearly reflects the maturity of this debate 
since the Malthusian era.” Although they dismiss the notion 
of a mono-causal relationship between demographic structure 
and violence, they do not fully explore important socio-
economic challenges and potential opportunities that could 
make youthful populations more of a boon than a ticking time 
bomb. Also, women play a crucial role in fostering peace but 
strategies must be culturally appropriate and lasting success 
could only be achieved when they work alongside men.
This debate in their article focuses on two important 
questions. First, is there a causal relationship between youthful 
populations and violent conflict? Second, if this is the case, 
could negative implications be effectively addressed through 
gender empowerment? Generally, youthful demographic 
structures in regions where unemployment is high creates 
situations of dependency that are not sustainable. The 15-25 
youth cohort grows at a much faster rate than the relatively 
more stable working population, leading to frustration, 
restiveness and deepening poverty. Making the leap from 
frustrated youth to violent youth or youth-fueled violence 
demands closer investigation. Weber3 makes a strong case 
for making this leap by arguing that young men are usually 
catalysts for political upheavals and associated violence 
in fragile regions. Sommers4 disagrees and calls for a more 
nuanced understanding of state-youth relationships. He 
outlines a number of socio-cultural and governance factors 
that explain the purported association. Sommers’ caution 
is borne out in a number of empirical studies that fail to 
establish causality.5,6 Yair and Miodownik7 had differentiated 
results, finding a correlation with respect to non-ethnic wars, 
but not in the case of ethnic wars. Urdal8 observed differences 
in the relationships at national and local levels. He found the 
no link between population growth rates and national armed 
conflict, but found some relationship at the local level, when 
resource scarcity was part of the equation. His empirical work 
also suggests that youth bulges could increase the likelihood 
of armed conflict when youth have poor access to basic 
social services, economic opportunity, and representative 
governance. These studies all point to the complex nature of 
the purported relationship between the size and structure of 
demographic aggregates and the incidence of violent conflict. 
There is also a sense in which the youth bulge could be 
viewed as a boon. There are two reasons for this. Most 
fragile economies are of a steady growth trajectory and 
many are diversifying away from an almost total reliance 
on single commodity exports to a greater involvement in 
the service sector (particularly media, telecommunications, 
and information technology), commercial agriculture 
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and small-medium scale manufacturing. High population 
growth countries like Nigeria, India, Kenya, and Columbia 
are experiencing increased labor market participation (both 
skilled and semi-skilled) along the value chains of these 
growing sectors. A relatively abundant, low-cost workforce 
has contributed to consistently high economic growth rates 
in these countries. However, as discussed by Potts et al,2 this 
demographic dividend is more pronounced and sustainable 
in countries where population dependency ratios are falling 
as families have fewer children. The second reason the youth 
bulge could be a boon is that frontier economies require 
the participation on risk-takers who start firms and create 
jobs. Essential preconditions for this include improved 
governance, reductions in barriers to trade, investment in 
critical infrastructure and an end to the culture of impunity 
(which breeds endemic corruption). Youthful entrepreneurs 
are breaking new ground in many of these countries and have 
the potential to contribute positively and become more vested 
in societal stability.9 Youth entrepreneurship will not be a 
panacea, but it could become an important factor in signaling 
change and more opportunity. Therefore, steps taken today 
to promote youth inclusion and equal opportunity could help 
forestall violent conflict over the long run.
Even if we cannot be definitive about causal links, the 
economic, socio-cultural, and political pressures caused by 
increasing population growth necessitate some thought being 
given to possible containment strategies. Potts et al2 discuss 
case studies that illustrate the benefits of family planning in 
potentially fragile environments. Reducing population size 
and the proportions of the population that are dependent 
on others makes imminent sense. Smaller families and 
spaced births could engender empowerment by cushioning 
the burden on household budgets and allowing more time 
for women to be more active participants in economic and 
socio-political life. This point was made emphatically in an 
article jointly authored by the prime ministers of Ethiopia and 
Rwanda in 2012.10 This, however, presupposes that cultural 
barriers do not exist. Children are viewed as blessings and 
assets in many societies. In some cases, even if women earn 
and have spare time, they are not decision-makers. Although 
there is some evidence that gender roles are slowly changing, 
progress has been glacial and episodic.11,12 Furthermore, data 
presented in the 2015 World Development Report suggests 
that poorer households are much less likely to benefit from 
family planning services because of issues relating to access 
and affordability. This compounds an already difficult 
situation and fuels a vicious cycle of persistent dependency, 
constrained socio-economic potential and unrest in these 
societies.
The spatial distribution of the population increases also 
matter. Rapid urbanization in developing and fragile regions 
present a challenge Buhaug and Urdal13 describe as an 
“urbanization bomb.” In many cases, intra-city cleavages have 
replaced the rural-urban divide as a major conflict interface 
in many urban areas. In addition to grinding poverty, cities in 
the developing world lack the necessary health infrastructure 
to provide family planning services to most citizens. 
Consequently, fertility levels tend to be much higher in the 
urban slums, partly because they are close enough to the 
hospitals and clinics to receive basic healthcare but unable to 
afford/access regular family planning services. Cities are also 
the frontier for recruitment by violent extremist organizations 
and the perpetration of acts of terrorism.14
Most empirical research evaluates the role of women in 
civil wars and trans-national armed conflict; relatively little 
empirical evidence has been presented to analyze the role 
of women in promoting peace and preventing violence in 
situations involving trans-national non-state actors. It is, 
therefore, difficult to be categorical about gender roles in 
such circumstances. Iran, one of the case studies used by 
Potts et al,2 substantiates this point. The country has clearly 
made significant gains with population control since the 
introduction of family planning and internal unrest has been 
quelled. However, Iran’s purported sponsorship of terrorist 
groups has made it much less secure and much more of a 
global threat. This suggests that the stabilizing effects of 
population reduction might vary depending on the type of 
conflict in question.
The jury is still out on the relationship between population 
growth and violent conflict. There are as many members of 
the 15-25 years old cohort working for peace, as those who 
perpetrate violence and human rights abusers. By the same 
token, the same high testosterone levels that are associated 
with dominance and violence can also foster healthy 
competition and innovation. Efforts to modify the population 
structure would only be effective if they are conducted in 
concert with initiatives that improve governance, promote 
broad-based economic welfare, and guarantee basic human 
rights for all. Representative governance is a central element 
of this strategy. The focus must shift from sporadic efforts to 
increase participation in democratic events (like elections) 
to ensuring that women and the youth are part of the 
democratic process. This involves routine consultations 
with community groups, the decentralization of decision-
making to allow for more input from hitherto marginalized 
groups and targeted investments to improve the quality of 
life. Governments should focus less on economic growth and 
a lot more on economic welfare, which incorporates both 
equity and equitable distribution of resources. This could 
be done via spending and taxation policies that incentivize 
prudent decisions by institutions and individuals, as well as 
social safety nets that would enable those living below the 
poverty line to avail themselves of available healthcare and 
educational opportunities. Creative financial intermediation 
could address critical barriers that make it hard for youth 
entrepreneurship and women-owned businesses to thrive. 
Gender empowerment must be considered a legitimate 
human right that is not incompatible with local culture or 
traditions. Governments must do more to uphold their part 
of the social contract through effective legislation (as in the 
case of Rwanda) of by expanding opportunities for women 
(as happened in Indonesia). Gender empowerment could 
contribute to slowing down population growth, but the 
beneficial impacts on peace and security would only accrue if 
empowerment is done in a manner that is culturally-sensitive 
and leads to lasting societal transformation that enables both 
men and women to work together to prevent the outbreak 
of violent conflict and to promote peace. Leadership, both 
political and technical, must be resolute and sustained, if 
meaningful progress is to be made. Adopting this approach, I 
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will take the liberty of paraphrasing Potts et al,2 the pill can be 
part of a comprehensive and coordinated solution that can be 
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